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1. Introduction 
 
Inaugurated as a field of research in academia more than fifty years ago with Hofstadter’s (1964) 
seminal paper “The Paranoid Style in American Politics”, the study of Conspiracy Theories 
(henceforth CTs) has mainly been carried out by philosophers, psychologists and sociologists 
(see Byford 2011 for an extensive review). Among the features of CTs that have been 
investigated are (i) the epistemological problems they pose (see Keeley 1999), (ii) their 
problematic status and propagation within civil societies (see Sunstein & Vermeule 2009), (iii) 
the processes that lead people to believe in them, including the influence of cognitive biases (see 
Brotherton & French 2014, Leman & Cinnirella 2007, Franks et al. 2013 among others). In this 
multidisciplinary endeavour, some consensus nevertheless seems to emerge as to what these 
narratives ‘do’ in terms of the way they attempt to fulfil their goals, namely persuading and 
spreading. It will be argued here that is significant from a rhetorical perspective. 
Defined as “proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the 
significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons – the conspirators – acting in 
secret” (Keeley 1999, p. 116), CTs are oftentimes analytically construed as discourses which are 
structured in particular ways and which attempt to persuade and spread in specific ways (see e.g. 
Byford 2011, chapter 2). A shared understanding of what CTs are and do, in terms of their 
rhetorical features, is in fact beginning to materialise in the literature on the topic: CTs are 
typically assessed as displaying some measure of persuasiveness, a self-sealing and irrefutable 
character and a commitment to inquiring about the truth that is prompted by (otherwise healthy) 
doubt regarding the official explanation of the event in question. Whether these agreed-upon 
features are sufficient to qualify CTs as a fully-fledged discursive genre, on a par with literary 
genres such as poetry and drama or with broader discursive genres alongside political debates or 
opinion columns in the written press, for instance, is still debatable (but see Zarefsky 2014, p. 
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204 for a hint at this), and I will not explore this direction here.1 Instead I will limit myself to 
defending the idea that they make use of recurring patterns that are argumentatively significant 
and that, as a consequence, they could be characterised in terms of a specific argumentation 
profile (in the sense of Hansen 2013) or of a specific argumentative pattern (in the sense of van 
Eemeren 2016). Section 2 of this paper will thus provide several arguments, which, taken 
together, serve to legitimise a systematic inquiry of CTs couched in argumentation theory. 
Moving beyond the limitations of a descriptive account, I will then reflect on the 
rhetorical appeal CTs seem to have, notwithstanding their recognised propensity to induce bias. 
CTs are said to rely on “crippled epistemologies” (Sunstein & Vermeule 2009, p. 211 ff.) in 
order to spread: they typically take advantage of people’s ignorance and of their inability – or 
unwillingness – to critically assess their content. When someone ends up accepting a given CT as 
a valid account of some event, it therefore means that something has prevented the individual 
from spotting that the claims contained in the CT were poorly evidenced. In other words, it 
means that the individual does not recognise the CT as an “unwarranted conspiracy theory”, in 
the terms of Keeley (1999, p. 111). In turn, it also means that CTs manage in one way or another 
to bypass epistemic vigilance filters (Sperber et al. 2010) and that their persuasiveness is likely to 
be studied with the same tools that can be used to study the persuasiveness of arguments. I will 
here draw on a cognitive pragmatic framework designed to tackle the rhetorical effects of 
fallacies (Oswald 2010, 2014, Maillat & Oswald 2009, 2011) to assess how features of the 
argumentation profile of CTs may play a part in their persuasive success. Section 3 will thus 
provide a rationale for this project and lay out the lines along which the study of the 
persuasiveness of CTs can be envisaged, in order to reveal a principled link between CTs’ 
argumentative profile and their rhetorical appeal. 
Section 4 applies this framework and analyses a very concrete feature of this 
argumentative profile, namely the fact that CT proponents are more likely to argue against their 
opponents than in favour of their own claims (as shown by Wood & Douglas 2013). I will argue 
that this can translate into the presence of arguments meant to refute claims and in particular into 
personal attacks. A case in point will be Werner Munter’s arguments against anthropogenic 
climate change. 
 
2. Defining an argumentation profile for CTs 
 
2.1. Recurring features of CTs 
 
Despite their (evident) argumentative import, CTs have to my knowledge not typically garnered 
a lot of attention within the community of argumentation scholars, with the exceptions of 
Zarefsky 2014 [1984], Danblon & Nicolas 2010, Herman 2010, and Oswald & Herman (forth). 
However, the literature on the subject originating from other disciplines exposes this 
argumentative import in a clear way, as we shall see next. 
Byford (2011, p. 4), for instance, holds CTs to belong to a “tradition of explanation” 
which is characterised by “a particular rhetorical style”, and, what is more, a style which persists 
over time, as contemporary CTs both borrow and draw on the rhetoric and arguments of previous 
CTs (ibid., p. 5). In particular, and as an echo to Hofstadter, Byford identifies two central 
                                                 
1 Genres can be defined as “clusters of conventionalized and predictable ways of goal-oriented communicative 
acting arising from imperatives posed by constantly evolving socio-cultural situations” (Cap & Okulska 2013:3) and 
I leave for another occasion a reflexion on whether CTs can be considered to be constrained by such imperatives. 
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rhetorical styles: the rhetoric of scientific inquiry and the rhetoric of just asking questions (2011, 
p. 88-93). The rhetoric of scientific inquiry is meant to convey an impression of irrefutability and 
displays the following features: 
 
 concern with demonstration and presentation of proof in reaction to an official 
story (henceforth OS) 
 representation of CT proponents as investigators and researchers 
 reliance on a multitude of arguments 
 emulation of formal features of academic discourse: reliance on jargon, pseudo-
demonstrations and proofs, references to other work (usually of other CT 
proponents), etc. 
 
In turn the rhetoric of just asking questions is designed in CTs as a refutational strategy with the 
following features: 
 
 representation of the CT not as a theory but as a question-asking systematic 
enterprise meant to expose the inaccuracy of the official story and make room for 
alternative conspiratorial accounts 
 challenge of official and ongoing research meant to expose lack of answers and 
the allegedly inherently dubious nature of the official story 
 reliance on errant data (details the official story has trouble explaining) 
 obfuscation of the CTs’ own flaws by means of excessive focus on the alleged 
problems of the official story 
 diversion of attention by forcing CT opponents to defend themselves – instead of 
allowing them to attack CT proponents’ claims 
 
A look at the literature in cognitive psychology on the factors that could be responsible 
for the stickiness of CT beliefs might provide additional evidence to undertake an analysis of 
CTs as a specific argumentative phenomenon. In a corpus study on how CT proponents deal with 
the promotion of conspiratorial material vs. the rejection of conventionalist material, Wood & 
Douglas (2013) found that CT proponents are more likely to argue against their opponents than 
in favour of their claims. Byford (2011, p. 131-134) reports that CT believers are particularly 
likely to give in to known cognitive biases such as the fundamental attribution bias (see Nisbett 
& Ross 1980), the major event-major cause heuristic (McCauley & Jacques 1979, Leman & 
Cinnirella 2007) and the conjunction fallacy (Brotherton & French 2014), which, in the case of 
CTs, play a role in generating reasons to reject OS and thereby favour alternative explanations. 
All these features, taken together, constitute in my view a clear indication that it makes 
sense to study CTs from a truly argumentative perspective, since such characterisation satisfies 
three of the basic criteria shared by argumentative objects of study. First, and based on Byford’s 
description, we can say that CTs fulfil one of the necessary conditions many contemporary 
accounts take to be inherent to argumentation (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, Govier 
2010, Barth & Krabbe 1982), namely the controversy or disagreement requirement. Because they 
systematically emerge in reaction to a consensual official story, CTs are in essence refutational 
narratives. That is, they put forward a claim as to the inaccuracy/invalidity of OS and provide 
evidence for that claim. They therefore materially realise the first dialectical step towards an 
argumentative exchange by making explicit the difference of opinion in the form of a challenge 
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formulated against OS. Second, the purposes and goals of CTs are typically those of 
argumentative objects: just like argumentations, CTs express their persuasive intent by setting 
out to cast doubt on OS. And, crucially, they are explanations presented as better explanations 
than OS. Third, their discursive manifestation looks like that of argumentations, in the sense that 
CTs offer arguments in the form of premise/conclusion articulations – or claim/argument 
complexes. Moreover, it could be claimed, following the literature on the weak epistemological 
features of CTs, that their unfalsifiable and self-sealing character is an even clearer indication 
that they make use of particular types of (fallacious) arguments (see section 2.3). 
 
2.2. Argumentation profiles and argumentative patterns 
 
Argumentation theorists might see in the previous characterisation a tempting point of entry into 
the study of CTs: if we assume that inferential processes in communication about disagreements 
are verbally expressed through argumentative means, then we can expect to find linguistic 
manifestations of the cognitive misfortunes previously evoked in the discourse of CT 
proponents. Put more simply: if CT believers are convinced by (but also generate) inferences 
which are cognitively biased in some way, we should see traces of these biases in their discourse. 
What I would like to propose at this point is that such a correspondence might very well translate 
into the use of specific (mostly fallaciously instantiated) argumentation schemes. Furthermore, I 
consider that this can lead to a more precise characterisation which can draw on contemporary 
research in argumentation theory around the notions of argumentation profile (Hansen 2013) and 
that of argumentative pattern (van Eemeren 2016). 
The concept of argumentation profile, defined by Hansen (2013, p. 148) as a “description 
or characterization of argumentation behaviour over time as exhibited by an argumentation agent 
– an individual or a group, party, or collective that makes and takes responsibility for 
arguments,” is originally designed to account for the communicative behaviour of agents in 
argumentative contexts over time. That is, the very notion of profile is meant to study “the 
argumentation behaviour of argument agents” (ibid., p. 150) in an attempt to systematically reach 
descriptive adequacy. Relevant to the notion of profile are argumentative concepts such as 
arguments kinds, argument schemes, pisteis, dialectical roles, dialogical roles and dialogical 
positions. These concepts are used by Hansen to characterise an agent’s argumentative behaviour 
in a way that is able to highlight the recurring patterns the agent resorts to in her or his 
argumentative activities. The descriptive usefulness of such an endeavour is to allow a fine-
grained characterisation of an argumentation profile we can expect a given agent to draw on as 
s/he argues. It is important to note that Hansen refrains from adopting an evaluative perspective 
but that he considers the possibility of doing so; we will see in the next section that by virtue of 
the “crippled epistemologies” that seem to characterise CTs, it can indeed make sense to 
normatively evaluate an argumentative profile.  
I should also mention at this point the differences between the goal I am pursuing here 
and the goals the very notion of argumentation profile, as defined by Hansen, is meant to reach. 
First, I will not be reporting here on a systematic characterisation of an alleged argumentation 
profile characterising all CTs over time. This preliminary and limited investigation includes a 
meta-analysis of existing literature on CTs from other disciplines and thus consists of a 
principled account of why it would make sense to identify an argumentative profile for an object 
like CTs, with possible pointers as to what specific parts of such an argumentation profile could 
look like. Second, I am not after a characterisation of a specific agent’s behaviour, but rather 
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after a characterisation of a particular type of narrative (hence the proximity with the notion of 
genre), which requires from the agent who endorses it to argumentatively behave in specific 
ways. 
Next to Hansen’s notion of argumentation profile, the notion of argumentative pattern, 
recently systematised in the pragma-dialectical framework (see the latest special issue of 
Argumentation, March 2016), represents another conceptual alternative for the type of goals I 
want to reach here. An argumentative pattern is  
 
a constellation of argumentative moves in which, in order to deal with a particular 
kind of difference of opinion, in defence of a particular type of standpoint a 
particular argument scheme or combination of argument schemes is used in a 
particular kind of argumentation structure (van Eemeren 2016, p. 15).  
 
I contend that available descriptions of CTs in extant literature allow for an account of 
CTs in terms of argumentative patterns: CTs in fact do consist of a set of argumentative moves 
meant to deal with a particular kind of difference of opinion (which can be mixed or nonmixed, 
single or multiple depending on whether the CT proponent makes an alternative account explicit 
and whether s/he attacks one or various claims relating to OS), they do emerge in defence of (or 
as attacks of) specific standpoints (either pro- or anti-OS) and, assuming the consensus in the 
literature is indeed right, I will show that they also tend to draw on an identifiable set of 
argument schemes and argument structures. Within pragma-dialectics, argumentative patterns 
are intimately linked to activity types, and this means that argumentative patterns bear 
institutional relevance, as they are deployed in order to realise “the institutional point of the 
communicative activity type” (ibid.). While the focus of argumentative patterns on specific types 
of argument schemes and structures is highly relevant to the purposes of this paper, the potential 
of CTs to be significant in institutional terms will not be addressed here – I am at the moment not 
convinced that CTs can be defined as fulfilling any institutional goal, nor, for that matter, that it 
makes sense to identify an activity type of ‘conspiring’ or ‘propagating CTs’. Accordingly, 
similarly to my usage of the notion of argumentative profile, my usage of the notion of 
argumentative pattern is only partial, as it focuses on a limited set of argumentatively relevant 
features such as argumentation schemes. 
To summarise, my goal is to identify recurring argumentative and rhetorical features of 
CTs; in this respect, this is similar to goals pursued in research conducted on argumentation 
profiles and argumentative patterns. However, my focus will cover neither the characterisation of 
an agent’s argumentative behaviour nor its institutional relevance. Instead, I choose to limit 
myself, in this paper, to studying the argumentative features of the discourse which has come to 
characterise CT rhetoric over the years. 
 
2.3. Towards an argumentation profile of CTs 
 
It is now possible to bring the contents of section 2.1 and 2.2 together in what I introduce as a 
first tentative argumentation profile of CTs which focuses on the types of arguments we should 
expect (unwarranted) CTs to make use of. Given (i) their argumentative and rhetorical nature, (ii) 
their refutational character and (iii) their likely relationship with cognitive biases, there is reason 
to assume that the sort of evidence CTs will rely on involves argument schemes and structures 
which can normatively be evaluated as fallacious. 
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A recurring feature noted by CT researchers lies in the refutational character of CTs, 
which emerge in reaction to an official account (OS) of a major event and which dismiss the 
latter in favour of a conspiratorial account. In what Byford described as the ‘rhetoric of just 
asking questions’, we find the idea that CTs typically try to discredit the sources mentioned by 
OS – but this can also be extended to cover OS proponents who would oppose the CT as well. 
This is typically done by casting doubt on either the integrity or the competence of the source of 
information that is mentioned: to take but only two famous examples, following this line, CT 
proponents of the account according to which 9/11 was an inside job consider that the Bush 
administration cannot be telling a true story about 9/11 because the conspirators are within its 
ranks; similarly, according to climate change denialists, we should not believe scientists who 
postulate the anthropogenic cause of climate change because they have vested interests in 
making the fossil-free energy market flourish. Examples are countless because, as noted by 
Keeley, “[t]he more evidence piled up by the authorities in favour of a given theory, the more the 
conspiracy theorist points to how badly ‘They’ must want us to believe the official story” (1999, 
p. 120). In other words, the more OS is adamant in putting forward OS, the more this is taken by 
CT proponents to be an indication that there is indeed a conspiracy.2 I contend that in CTs this 
translates into a systematic display of mistrust towards scientists and official sources (see also 
Lewandowsky et al. 2013, who find that rejection of science correlates with adoption of CT 
beliefs). From an argumentative perspective, therefore, and given that positive evidence on the 
untrustworthiness of the sources mentioned in OS is lacking, I expect CTs to resort to ad 
hominem arguments, which, ironically enough, many times take the form of a charge of 
conspiracy against OS proponents (see the example discussed in section 4). This assumption 
echoes the results of the study by Wood & Douglas (2013), who found that CT proponents are 
more likely to prefer attacking OS than defending their own account. Generalising from this 
negative attitude towards official and scientific sources, and drawing on Byford’s observations 
about the rhetoric of scientific inquiry, whereby CTs emulate academic discourse, we should 
therefore expect CTs to typically rely on source-related arguments. In particular, I would venture 
that given the lack of concern for argument soundness or acceptability, source-related arguments 
such as ad populum and ad verecundiam are to be expected in CT corpora. The presence of these 
source-related arguments, whether they are used to attack various aspects of OS or to support 
conspiratorial claims, would be a clear indication that CTs are indeed biased in the selectiveness 
of the sources they grant their trust to. 
Moving beyond the way CTs manage their allocation of trust to sources of information, 
there is more to say on the justificatory features of their content, which have consensually been 
said to leave much to be desired. Hofstadter famously stated that CTs rely on a “big leap from 
the undeniable to the unbelievable” (1964, p. 35). Sunstein & Vermeule (2009) hold them to 
draw on “crippled epistemologies”, which hints at the idea that there is something about 
successful CTs that makes their victims’ critical testing procedures fail. Keeley defines them as 
unwarranted CTs, as the way they explain facts seem to undermine the strength of their 
explanation. All these various characterisations have in common the idea that CTs’ reliance on 
evidence is, to say the least, problematic. Building on Jackson’s idea that fallacies are “failed 
diagnostic strategies” (Jackson 1996, p. 111), I will thus suggest that this can make us expect 
CTs to make use of a number of fallacious arguments. For instance, Byford’s observation that 
                                                 
2 Notice that this is also something that contributes to CTs self-sealing nature, as noted by Zarefsky (2014[1984], p. 
205): “It [the CT] is virtually impossible to disprove, and even discrepant evidence can be explained easily as the 
work of the clever conspirator who is trying to cover his tracks.” 
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evidence for one conspiracy theory becomes evidence for all of them seems to be compatible 
with Swami et al.’s (2010) findings that belief in one CT correlates with belief in other CTs. In 
turn, from an argumentative perspective, this could make us expect to find that CTs are likely to 
rely on arguments from generalisation and arguments from analogy, perhaps more so than other 
argumentative genres. One does not need to look very far to find CT proponents draw analogies 
between major events in order to juxtapose conspiratorial explanations: a recent example is Paul 
Craig Roberts’ analogy between the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 and 9/11 concerning 
the finding of a terrorist’s ID papers in the aftermath of both attacks – on Ground Zero on 9/11 
and in the getaway car of the Kouachi brothers in Paris.3  
Keeley (1999) and Byford (2011), among many others, note that it is typical of CTs to 
mistake insufficient or non-representative evidence for acceptable evidence. As a way of 
theorising this idea, CT scholars have coined the term errant data, defined as a set of “specific 
details (which are mostly irrelevant, attributable to coincidence, or based on inaccurate 
information or false premise) that have not been adequately accounted for by the received (non-
conspiratorial) explanation” (Byford 2011, p. 92). Errant data is taken to play a fundamental role 
in any CT, as it is taken to functionally behave as the initial building block of the conspiratorial 
account (see Keeley 1999, p. 119). Seeing as CTs thus seem to build on non-representative or 
insufficient evidence, we could expect them to display a proclivity to make use of inductive or 
abductive argument schemes, i.e., those defeasible argument schemes which are based on 
evidence that is uncertain or evidence whose relevance to the issue is itself uncertain. The leap 
from “the undeniable to the unbelievable” mentioned by Hofstadter in his essay on the paranoid 
style in North American politics could very well build on the fact of inducing or abducing the 
presence of a conspiracy from the many problems faced by OS. The mere existence and presence 
of errant data as the starting point of a CT makes it likely to make use of such argument schemes. 
Another recurring feature mentioned in the literature on CTs lies in their propensity to 
state or encourage the derivation of claims which are inferred from the absence of contrary 
evidence. For example, on Paul Craig Roberts’ account of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France, 
the fact that no mainstream US media reported the suicide of a French official investigating the 
attacks is brought forward to cast doubt on OS; common conspiratorial accounts of 9/11 hold 
that if it had indeed been a real terrorist attack, the US military would have gunned the planes 
down before they could have crashed the World Trade Center.4 Inference of fact based on the 
absence of evidence of the contrary is known, in argumentation theory, as the ad ignorantiam 
fallacy, or appeal to ignorance (see e.g. Walton 1999). We also find in Byford’s characterisation 
of CTs as making use of the rhetoric of just asking questions the idea that CTs typically exploit 
absence of evidence: an example of this would be the fact that CTs sometimes take advantage of 
Oss’ inability to provide positive evidence due to the limits of scientific progress (this may 
happen in CTs around scientific phenomena, such as climate change or AIDS). 
Finally, some empirical research suggests that CTs are likely to adopt a very specific 
dialectical stance. As previously mentioned, Wood & Douglas (2103, p. 7) found in their study 
of online comments about the tenth anniversary of 9/11 that “conspiracy advocates showed a 
tendency to spend much more time arguing against the official explanation of 9/11 than 
                                                 
3 See Paul Craig Roberts’ account here: http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2015/01/13/charlie-hebdo-paul-craig-
roberts/ (last accessed, 18.03.2016).  
4 In the corpus Wood & Douglas (2013) used, to which I was granted access, we find comments such as “Inside Job 
9/11! If it was a real terrorist attack U.S. military would have blew (sic) up the planes while in the air before they 
could hit any population area!” 
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advocating an alternative.” Coupled with Keeley’s observation that “the conspiracy theorist is 
working in a domain where the investigated actively seeks to hamper the investigation” (1999, p. 
120), it seems that CT proponents will argue from the position of refutation and challenge. In 
their discourse, in light of errant data and of the absence of contrary evidence, they repeat that it 
is OS that has serious justificatory problems, not the CT. Therefore, the burden of argumentation 
is nearly always directed at OS: the position of he who asks questions, or the challenger, is much 
less subject to the need of providing justifications than the position of the attacked, since it is the 
acceptability of OS which is called into question.5 As a consequence, we should expect CTs to 
exhibit a rather simplified management of the burden of proof, more often than not in ways that 
are meant to shift the burden of proof to CT opponents (and partisans of OS). 
Summing up the contribution of this section, I have tried to systematically draw parallels 
between extant characterisations of how CTs operate from an epistemological perspective and 
expected argumentative behaviour in an attempt to sketch an argumentation profile of CTs built 
around the type of argumentative structures likely to be found in them. The idea is that there are 
good reasons to expect recurring features of CTs to translate into the recurrent use discursive use 
of known weak or fallacious argumentation schemes, namely, in what I have surveyed so far, 
source-related fallacies (ad populum, ad verecundiam, ad hominem), hasty generalisations, 
arguments from analogy, inductive and abductive arguments, ad ignorantiam, and shifting the 
burden of proof. This last observation might also serve as an indication that it might be relevant 
in the establishment of the argumentation profile of CTs to consider the type of dialectical roles 
they favour. In what I have surveyed so far, it seems that CTs function as narratives which are 
meant to remain untouched: they call into question OS and highlight its alleged weaknesses, 
thereby allowing CT proponents to claim the role of critical observer and escape positive 
dialectical obligations themselves. 
It should be noted that I neither claim that (i) these first elements of characterisation are 
both exhaustive and exclusive, nor that (ii) finding these argumentative devices is a necessary 
indication that the text under consideration qualifies as a CT. However, I do believe that CTs are 
very likely to make use of these argumentation schemes in fallacious ways by virtue of their 
problematic epistemological ways. The next step to ground and hopefully validate this first 
descriptive stage in an investigation of the argumentative features of CTs would be an empirical 
study of CT corpus, which I have not been able to start yet. Let me now turn to the second goal 
of this paper, namely an assessment of the rhetorical effectiveness of CTs. 
 
3. Rhetorical effectiveness of CTs 
 
Judging by their pervasiveness and their massive (online) propagation, CTs appear to be 
rhetorically appealing as culturally transmitted objects. Moreover, and following the assumptions 
of cultural epidemiology (see Sperber 1985, Sperber et al. 2010), it could be said that the reason 
for their spreading has to do with how relevant they are found by their target populations. I will 
explore here the possibility that CTs can be rhetorically appealing by virtue of their ability to 
escape or bypass some basic checks our epistemic vigilance filters should perform in their 
processing. 
                                                 
5 This is also supported by the idea that many times CT proponents do not appear to have a standpoint to defend, 
other than ‘OS is wrong’. As a consequence, it is sometimes difficult to identify the dialectical obligations 
contracted by CT proponents. 
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I have mentioned earlier that in order to be effective from a rhetorical perspective, CTs 
need to obfuscate their argumentative and evidential weaknesses, or at least to draw their 
audience’s attention away from them. In cognitive psychological terms, it can thus be said that 
CTs need to either fool or satisfy our epistemic vigilance filters. I also mentioned earlier (see 
section 2.3) that an argumentative profile of CTs would expect them to address sources of 
information, in an attempt to discredit those the OS relies on and to give credit to those the CT 
relies on, and that achieving this result can typically be done through the use of source-related 
fallacies. Now, since it is also the case that CTs are epistemically flawed, it means that their 
content – the second dimension on which we exert epistemic vigilance according to theory – is 
also flawed in some way, and, crucially, that content weakness also manages to remain under the 
critical radar. 
From a cognitive perspective, describing rhetorical effectiveness amounts to specifying 
under which cognitive conditions arguments come to be effective, and more precisely under 
which conditions inferential processes of information selection are such that they result in the 
addition of the argument’s conclusion into the addressee’s cognitive environment (see Oswald 
forth.). In this picture, it is important to consider that two sets of information partake in the 
evaluative process that leads to the state of being convinced/persuaded:6 the content of the 
argument and the conclusion (taken together with their accessibility and strength in the 
addressee’s cognitive environment) and the set of critical assumptions that are mobilised in order 
to evaluate it (taken together, as well, with its accessibility and strength in the addressee’s 
cognitive environment). I will discuss rhetorical effectiveness in terms of how these two sets of 
information behave in the way an argument is evaluated in an argumentative communicative 
context. 
Saying that an argument, be it fallacious or not, has managed to convince its audience 
amounts to saying that either it has withstood critical evaluation or that it has been accepted 
without any critical evaluation. I would like to suggest that these two scenarios are likely to be 
subdivided into four cases as follows. An argument is rhetorically effective when  
 
(i) all relevant critical information has been considered and the epistemic 
advantages of the conclusion prevail;  
(ii) the conclusion is immediately consistent with an epistemically strong 
representation (or with a subset of epistemically strong representations) 
contained in the addressee’s cognitive environment;  
(iii) no critical information is present in the cognitive environment at the time of 
evaluation;  
(iv) there is no reason to summon critical information. 
 
Cases (i) and (ii) highlight the role of epistemic strength in rhetorical effectiveness, as 
they stipulate that the conclusion is accepted by virtue of the argument’s epistemic superiority 
over critical information sets. Cases (iii) and (iv) highlight the role of the accessibility to and 
availability of critical information in rhetorical effectiveness, showing that failing to access 
critical information should in principle increase persuasiveness (provided, of course, the content 
                                                 
6 I choose not to make a distinction between conviction and persuasion at this point, even if I am aware of 
terminological disputes regarding the two terms. My interest in this paper is the state in which the claim put forward 
in the argumentation ends up belonging to the addressee’s cognitive environment and I will accordingly use the 
terms persuasion/conviction with this denotation in mind. 
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of the argument is itself plausible in the addressee’s cognitive environment). From this analytical 
overview of possibilities, it emerges that an argument is rhetorically effective when the 
articulation between premises and conclusion is epistemically strong and/or when the cognitive 
processing cost (interpreted in terms of information accessibility) of the evaluative procedure, 
notably in what regards the mobilisation of critical information, remains advantageous. Put more 
simply, an individual will end up accepting the conclusion of an argument when she finds its 
content particularly plausible in light of the criticism she can think of at that point. 
I have argued elsewhere and with others (e.g., Oswald 2010, 2011, 2014, forth., Oswald 
& Lewiński 2014, Maillat & Oswald 2009, 2011, Oswald & Hart 2013) that it makes sense to 
interpret these parameters in terms of Sperber & Wilson’s extent conditions of relevance 
(Sperber & Wilson 1995, p. 125). Here I will limit myself to recall what this reductionist take on 
rhetorical effectiveness involves,7 by offering a twofold construal of the process. On the one 
hand, the idea is that when arguments in favour of a claim are being evaluated in order to 
determine whether the claim should be accepted, what the cognitive system is doing amounts to 
weighing the epistemic strength of the information contained in the premise/conclusion 
articulation against the information that is already present in the addressee’s cognitive 
environment (which may include critical information). On the other hand, it is also assumed that 
this very process is affected by the presence/absence of critical information – i.e. by whether the 
cognitive system supplies critical information sets or not – and by the extent to which the latter is 
epistemically strong. In such a framework, rhetorical effectiveness comes to be defined as a 
function of (i) the strength/weakness of the claim/argument complex and (ii) of both the 
strength/weakness and presence/absence of critical information. 
More to the point in terms of analysing the rhetorical effectiveness of arguments, this 
framework postulates that persuasive strategies are of two kinds: there are strengthening and 
weakening strategies. Strengthening strategies are meant to foreground information that is 
compatible with the content of the claim/argument complex; this can be done by making such 
information epistemically strong and more accessible. Weakening strategies are the ones which 
target critical information in order to background it; this can be achieved by making it 
epistemically weaker and less accessible – if not altogether inaccessible. In such a framework, 
known fallacies can be reinterpreted as enforcing such strategies: ad hominem arguments are 
weakening strategies meant to decrease the epistemic strength of a piece of information by 
discrediting its source; ad verecundiam arguments are strengthening strategies meant to increase 
the epistemic strength of a piece of information by giving credit to its source; red herrings are 
weakening strategies meant to divert attention away from the representation of critical 
information, and so on. 
The overall rationale for studying the argumentative profile of CTs in terms of their 
rhetorical appeal is thus to be found, within the framework adopted here, in the recognition that 
the types of arguments employed therein are meant to behave in a very specific way: given that 
they should be evaluated as unacceptable or invalid, depending on the normative standard one 
wants to apply, I will therefore assume that these are fallacious arguments whose rhetorical 
effectiveness precisely lies in the obfuscation of their fallaciousness. If CTs manage to convince 
despite their objective epistemic flaws, it is because those who believe in them failed to assess 
the arguments put forward by them as fallacious. And this, I venture, can be analysed as the 
success of various strengthening and weakening strategies meant to influence the process of 
                                                 
7 It is important to state that this reductionist perspective is necessarily partial and that the work presented here 
should not be taken to defend that this is the only cognitive process at stake in persuasion. 
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information selection. What an analyst interested in the persuasiveness of CTs should be out for, 
therefore, are those discursive formulations that might bias argumentative evaluation by 
foregrounding and backgrounding sets of information. I now turn to an illustration of this type of 
analysis. 
 
4. A case in point: Werner Munter’s arguments against anthropogenic climate change 
 
In order to illustrate how the previous framework can be used to analyse the rhetorical 
effectiveness of CTs in a way that would contribute to an understanding of their argumentation 
profile, I will analyse in what follows an excerpt of an interview given by Werner Munter, a 
renowned retired Swiss mountaineering guide who also has an taken an amateur recent interest in 
global warming.8 According to him, there is no question that global warming is happening, but to 
think that humans have something to do with it is foolish, arrogant and wrong, as he believes it is 
only a natural phenomenon. In 2014, year of the 5th IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change) assessment which confirmed that 97% of climate scientists agree on anthropogenic 
climate change, Werner Munter was interviewed twice (Le Matin, 03.05.2014 and swissinfo.ch, 
31.10.2014). In the first of these two interviews, he states the following:9 
 
(1) (about the IPCC assessment): “The official thesis? Rubbish!” 
(2) (about the 97% of scientific consensus): “These people are imbeciles who 
repeat foolish things in a continuous loop, who know it and are paid to do it.” 
 
The standpoint (1) is supported by three arguments in the interview, which look like scientific 
arguments. Munter argues that climate data shows that global warming is a natural and cyclical 
phenomenon, that the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is negligible and that the official 
thesis about global warming contradicts the laws of physics. These arguments are a matter of 
proper scientific debate and have actually already been refuted by experts on many forums and 
blogs,10 which is why I will not discuss them here. What I am interested in at this point is rather 
what Munter replies to the interviewer after that. Between the second and third argument, the 
journalist acknowledges that Munter seems to make a point, as he asks “So why is the official 
thesis quasi-consensual? Your scientific colleagues are not all imbeciles!” To this, Munter 
replies the following: 
 
(3) “Those theories aim at making us feel guilty. When scientists such as those of 
the IPCC say they want to save the planet, I say that they are not credible. They 
lie to preserve economic interests, among which their own. Because there is 
business behind the fight against global warming. There is a will to scare 
people, for example by over-dramatizing the rise of oceans, when they rise 
only 2 to 3 mm per year! Talking about CO2 in tons rather than in proportion is 
                                                 
8 Werner Munter is the inventor of the ‘3x3 method’ designed to assess risks when mountaineering, which is taught 
in many alpine club courses. He is a well-known figure in the mountaineering community and has also given his 
name to a hitch used in climbing, the Munter hitch. 
9 The interview is available (in French) here: http://www.lematin.ch/suisse/La-these-officielle-Une-
foutaise/story/19748787. (last accessed 21.03.2016) 
10 See for instance http://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php and, specifically regarding Munter’s interview, a 
reply (in French): http://walker-france.com/climat-les-aneries-de-werner-munter/ (both last accessed 21.03.2016). 
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also intellectual manipulation. Tons are impressive, but let’s not forget that the 
atmosphere weighs 5’000’000’000’000’000 tonnes (5 million billion tons)!” 
 
The purpose of this section is to analyse how part of this answer serves as a charge of conspiracy 
launched by Munter on the IPCC scientists and the proponents of OS. To see where this charge is 
exactly located, let us first look at the argument more closely. His answer in (3) can be taken to 
defend the claim that the IPCC’s theory is the result of a conspiracy. Here is a possible 
reconstruction of this argumentative articulation: 
 
(4) Claim: The official thesis is the result of a conspiracy 
(5) Premise: Those theories aim at making us feel guilty 
(6) Premise: Those theories are defended by scientists who are not credible 
(7) Premise: There is a will to scare people (with examples) 
(8) Premise (implicit): any theory which cumulates these three properties is the 
result of a conspiracy 
 
In this reconstruction, (8) is an implicit premise that reveals the argument from sign behind 
Munter’s qualification of OS (if it looks like a conspiracy, it is a conspiracy). The premise in (6) 
is the one that is further elaborated on by Munter in the text, and that this is where the root of the 
charge of conspiracy will eventually originate. I argue that this is a case of subordinate 
argumentation, and thus that (6) also functions as a sub-standpoint supported by a premise which 
itself becomes an additional standpoint supported by an additional premise. This would be 
reconstructed as follows: 
 
(9) Claim: These theories are defended by scientists who are not credible 
(10) Premise: These scientists lie to preserve economic interests, among which their 
own 
(11) Premise (implicit): Scientists who lie are not credible 
 
And the second subordinate argumentation would look like this: 
 
(12) Claim: These scientists lie to preserve economic interests, among which their 
own 
(13) Premise: There is a whole business behind the fight against global warming 
(14) Premise (implicit): If there is a business behind research, then researchers are 
liars 
 
Munter’s idea is that the whole IPCC business is a conspiracy, and that the IPCC theses are 
wrong precisely because they emanate from people with a secret agenda, as revealed in (14). 
Now, it is interesting to note that (6) functions like a personal attack, and specifically a fallacious 
one: for one, the charge of conspiracy is not made explicit and has to be inferred. Moreover, it 
fails to be precisely defined: we infer that IPCC scientists are conspirators, but we neither know 
what kind of “business” they are into, nor what kind of interests they have. It thus seems that the 
only support that Munter offers in favour of his charge of conspiracy is the suspicion of some 
sort of secret agenda. How can we now make sense of the rhetorical prospects of this argument? 
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Consistently with the framework presented in section 3, I argue that the argumentation 
contained in (3) instantiates at the same time a weakening and a strengthening strategy. Munter 
rejects OS by saying that its theories emanate from a bunch of liars. The perlocutionary effect of 
the use of this ad hominem is thus to make sure that whatever these experts say is taken to be 
epistemically weak by the audience. The goal of a personal attack, in epistemic terms, is thus to 
weaken the chances that the addressee will include what the target of the attack says in his 
cognitive environment. This way, Munter tries increase the chances that his readers will 
disregard the IPCC theses. But I argue that this cognitive constraint is only part of the overall 
rhetorical strategy. 
It must be recalled here that the argument presented in (3) is not interpreted solely on its 
merits, what is more in an informational void. The argument is part of a complex discourse in 
which Munter has already presented arguments that look scientifically plausible to the untrained 
eye – as knowledge of both physics and climate science would be required to help us understand 
that they are flawed. Assuming that the average reader does not possess this knowledge, it is 
reasonable to assume that once the ‘pseudo-scientific’ arguments are released, some sort of 
expectation is triggered as to their consequences regarding the topic of the interview. A clear 
indication of this is to be found in the reporter’s question: if it is true that the IPCC reports do not 
hold from a scientific perspective, then how come so many scientists support them? At this point, 
it can be said that the reader is led (and I dare say even constrained) to expect some answer that 
will resolve the paradoxical situation. Munter is happy to supply an aptly relevant resolution by 
declaring that the IPCC theories are the fruit of a conspiracy. In other words, the charge of 
conspiracy (whereby Munter accuses IPCC experts of being conspirators) is likely to be found 
relevant in a context where unverifiable scientific refutation is offered: not only is it highly 
accessible in the context (we are waiting for something that explains why so many experts persist 
in supporting ‘bad’ science – according to Munter), but it is also contextually extremely useful, 
from a cognitive perspective, as it resolves the paradox which Munter has previously created. 
The charge of conspiracy in this case functions as a way of reinforcing the claim/argument 
complex put forward by Munter in opposition to the scientific consensus. In a way, Munter has 
used the ‘errant data technique’: he has pointed to inconsistencies relating to OS and is at the 
same time supplying the explanation that would make sense of the perceived paradox. 
In this interview, Munter therefore offers a cognitively advantageous solution to a 
problem that was generated by his own previous refutations. With (3), he is therefore offering a 
relevant (in Sperber & Wilson’s cognitive technical sense of relevance, i.e. in a cost-effective 
way) chain of representations by generating trouble and by immediately supplying a resolution 
for it (see also Saussure 2005 on the deceptiveness of trouble-and-resolution cognitive patterns). 
It could thus be said that in addition to increasing the chances that the attack will be perceived as 
relevant, Munter is also offering a sense of global coherence. I contend that for a reader who has 
not questioned Munter’s previous pseudo-scientific arguments, the story he offers makes sense 
and has chances of being rhetorically appealing because it weakens OS and at the same time 
strengthens Munter’s own conspiratorial account. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have pursued two goals. The first has been to elaborate an argumentation profile 
of CTs by making explicit the parallels that can be drawn between on the one hand the features 
of CTs, as described in extant literature originating in philosophy, social and cognitive 
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psychology, and the argumentative significance of these features on the other. I have tried to 
defend the idea that such an argumentation profile is possible, at least if we consider the types of 
argument schemes and the sort of dialectical roles we are likely to find in CTs. In particular, I 
have argued that it is reasonable to expect CTs to make use of source-related fallacies (ad 
populum, ad verecundiam, ad hominem), hasty generalisations, arguments from analogy, 
inductive and abductive arguments, ad ignorantiam, and shifts in the burden of proof. All these 
arguments are additionally expected to appear in refutational strategies which are about an 
assessment of the OS rather than about a defence of the CT. 
I have then drawn on a cognitive pragmatic framework to propose a reductionist take on 
rhetorical effectiveness, which holds that an assumption ends up belonging to an individual’s 
cognitive environment after undergoing an assessment affected by constraints on the 
accessibility and epistemic strength of different sets of information: the more the information 
contained in the argumentation is foregrounded (in terms of accessibility and epistemic strength) 
and the critical information is backgrounded (in the same terms), the more the argumentation is 
likely to be successful, and vice-versa. I have then tried to illustrate these strengthening and 
weakening strategies with an example of ad hominem taken from a contemporary CT about the 
alleged natural causes of global warming. 
While these results can be taken to suggest a fruitful assessment of CTs within an 
argumentative framework, I acknowledge their limitations and consider that they still need to be 
empirically and experimentally validated. Further research is needed in the two strands of this 
research project. Exhaustive corpus analysis first needs to be performed on CT material to 
confirm the argumentation profile sketched in what precedes. Moreover, from an experimental 
perspective the assumptions made in sections 3 and 4 need to be evaluated by putting to the test 
experimental designs meant to confirm whether information selection can indeed be constrained 
on the accessibility and epistemic dimensions, this in turn resulting in changes in the subject’s 
cognitive environment. 
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